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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

[REDACTED]
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking

FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Transfer of Responsibility for Maintaining
SCI Access Approval Records

REFERENCE: Your Undated Memo to the DCI, same
subject [REDACTED]

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1. We have reviewed your memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence which suggests that responsibility for maintaining records of Community TK and COMINT approvals and reporting thereon, as well as coordinating all requests for increases in SCI access approval levels, be transferred to the Security Committee.

2. I fully understand the logic of the Security Committee Staff reporting on the TK and COMINT approvals, and I am amenable to accepting that responsibility if certain technical problems are ironed out.

3. As you know, the [REDACTED] system [REDACTED], which I manage, 25X1 is my tool for developing strength levels of extant access approvals. The COMIREX and SIGINT Committee have been compiling semi-annual reports for the DCI on the basis of input from each member Agency or Department. These figures, at present, are at variance with numbers generated by [REDACTED] 25X1 One specific case in point exists at the Department of Energy (DOE). [REDACTED] in June 1978 that there were [REDACTED] personnel

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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

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[REDACTED]

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at DOE with COMINT; [REDACTED] showed [REDACTED] at DOE. A Security Committee check revealed that DOE reported to the SIGINT Committee a figure which included personnel assigned to DOE itself as well as their contractor laboratories (Lawrence Livermore, Sandia and Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories).

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4. I would suggest that COMIREX and the SIGINT Committee provide the DCI with the semi-annual report due in December 1978, and use that exercise as the opportunity to reconcile any differences that exist between their reporting and [REDACTED]. With the satisfactory resolution of any such anomalies, I would propose that the Security Committee then take over semi-annual reporting responsibilities in June 1979.

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5. In July 1977, the DCI also advised the Community that any new access approvals not offset by corresponding debriefings of previously accessed, must receive an endorsement of need-to-know by the Chairman, COMIREX or SIGINT Committee or the Director, NRO as appropriate. He did so envisioning that these officials were in the best position to advise him on need-to-know in their areas of concern. I believe that this was a correct decision and that neither the Security Committee nor the Chief, Community Security Group are in any position to make such judgments from their vantage point. The roles of COMIREX, SIGINT Committee and NRO in the tasking and development loop more than adequately address their special competence as to what it takes to get the job done and what price in the way of additional access approvals must be paid. Your scheme would continue need-to-know with the appropriate authorities and would only add an additional, and I think unnecessary, processing layer on the system, which I consider counter-productive. Therefore, I cannot endorse your recommendation that the Security Committee or its staff be the coordinating body for increases in SCI approvals. I suggest that we continue to have requests for increased SAA's processed as has been the case since July 1977.

[REDACTED]

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6. I believe [] has already reviewed with Ted Shackley some of the past problems incurred in processing some of these requests, as well as explaining the legitimate role of the Special Security Center in processing requests for additional SAA's on behalf of non-NFIB agencies and that there is now a full understanding on this matter.

John F. Blake

Attachment:

Ref

Distribution:

Copy 1 - D/DCI/CT

Copy 2 - DDA

Copy ③ - C/SECOM

Copy 4 - OS Registry

Copy 5 - SECOM Subject

Copy 6 - SECOM Control

Copy ⑦ - SECOM Chrono

SECOM []:efn (16 Nov 78)

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ORIGINATOR:

Robert W. Gambino
Chairman, DCI Security Committee

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[redacted]
Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking

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SUBJECT: Transfer of Responsibility for Maintaining
SCI Access Approval Records

1. Action Requested: That you approve the recommendations in paragraph 5 and sign the attached memorandum to the NFIB.

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2. Background: In July 1977 you established the policy of (a) stabilizing the 1 June 1977 levels of COMINT, TALENT-KEYHOLE and [redacted] system access approvals and (b) effecting reductions in the number of persons holding such access approvals. Since then, the Chairmen, COMIREX and SIGINT Committee, have reported periodically to you on the totals of COMINT and TALENT-KEYHOLE accesses within the intelligence community. In addition, for each new access to these compartments which cannot be offset by a commensurate debriefing, the requests have been reviewed and staffed by the appropriate chairman prior to submission to you for approval. The Chairman, Security Committee, has been involved in staffing requests for increases in [redacted] accesses. Occasionally, the staffs of all three committees as well as CIA's Special Security Center and the NRO have been involved in staffing a request for an increase in a few SCI billets. There is no computerized data base to support this effort.

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3. Discussion: I believe the establishment of the Community Security Group (CSG) under the Deputy to the DCI for Support provides an excellent opportunity to consolidate certain functions under one office. I understand it is your intention to establish under CSG responsibility for a computerized data base of all SCI access approvals using the [redacted] program as the initial step. Transfer to CSG of the reporting function for SCI access totals and establishment of the Chief, CSG, as the focal point for staffing requests for increases in the totals of SCI access could serve to speed up the process of establishing a complete computerized record of all SCI access approvals. Centralization of these responsibilities will also help to ensure that requests for increases in access approvals which often involve more than one compartment are efficiently handled and coordinated with the appropriate parties. 25X1

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
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4. Staff Position: The Chairmen, Security, COMIREX and SIGINT Committees agree, and this proposal has been endorsed by the Deputy to the DCI for Support and Director, NRO.

5. Recommendations:

a. That you assign responsibility for maintaining records of community TK and COMINT access approvals and submission of periodic reports of such totals to the Chief, Community Security Group (CGS) vice the Chairmen, COMIREX and SIGINT Committees.

b. That you designate the Chief, CSG, as the appropriate officer to manage the coordination of all requests for SCI access approvals which cannot be offset by a commensurate debriefing. The Chief, CSG, will coordinate the substantive impact of such requests with the Chairmen of the SIGINT and COMIREX Committees and the Director, NRO, as appropriate and obtain their validation prior to submitting them to you for approval.



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Attachment:
As stated

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
Director of Central Intelligence

Date

DISAPPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date



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The Director of Central Intelligence
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Washington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Community Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information



REFERENCES: a. NFIB-9.1/33, 31 March 1978
b. DCI SCI Security Policy, dated 5 July 1977

1. As you know, I have established a Community Security Group (CSG) within the office of the Deputy to the DCI for Support to serve as the focal point for community security affairs and to provide staff support to the DCI Security Committee (reference a.).

25X1 2. At my direction the Chairmen, COMIREX and SIGINT Committee, have been reporting periodically to me on the status of community access to certain sensitive compartmented information since July 1977. In addition, each new access to [] COMINT and TALENT-KEYHOLE information which cannot be offset by a commensurate debriefing is reviewed by the appropriate committee chairman or Director, NRO, prior to submission to me for approval. In a few cases the Chairman, Security Committee, has been involved in staffing requests for increases in [] accesses.

3. I have determined that the maintenance of all SCI access totals is an appropriate responsibility for the Community Security Group. Effective immediately, all reports of SCI access totals are to be submitted to the Chief, Community Security Group, who will continue to provide me periodic status reports.

25X1 4. In addition, I am instituting the following procedures which should assist us all in processing requests for increases in SCI access approvals (SI, TK, [] which cannot be offset by commensurate debriefings. Henceforth, such requests should be submitted to the Deputy to the DCI for Support (D/DCI/Support). On behalf of the D/DCI/Support the Chief, CSG, will review each request and refer it to the Chairmen, SIGINT Committee, COMIREX and/or the Director, NRO,



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as appropriate for validation prior to my ultimate approval. To ensure that the correct individuals are involved in the coordination process, it is important that the detailed justification for each request for increases in access to the TALENT-KEYHOLE system specify whether such access is required to support a SIGINT, imagery [REDACTED] The attached flow chart depicts the coordination process which will be followed for such requests.

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STANSFIELD TURNER

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As stated

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
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- 1 - NFIB Secretariat
- 2 - DCI
- 3 - DDCI
- 4 - ER
- 5 - D/DCI/CT
- 6 - C/COMIREX
- 7 - C/SECOM
- 8 - CT Registry
- 9 - SIGINT-4.2/ File
- 10- SIGINT Chrono

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